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Abstract:	When	are	governments	most	likely	to	use	election	violence,	and	what	
factors	can	mitigate	government	incentives	to	resort	to	violence?	How	do	the	
dynamics	of	election	violence	differ	in	the	pre‐	and	post‐election	periods?	Our	
central	argument	is	that	an	incumbent’s	fear	of	losing	power	as	the	result	of	an	
election,	as	well	as	institutionalized	constraints	on	the	incumbent’s	decision‐
making	powers,	are	pivotal	in	her	decision	to	use	election	violence.	While	it	may	
seem	obvious	to	suggest	that	incumbents	use	election	violence	in	an	effort	to	
fend	off	threats	to	their	power,	it	is	not	obvious	how	to	gauge	these	threats,	and	a	
central	purpose	of	our	research	is	to	identify	sources	of	information	about	the	
incumbent’s	popularity	that	can	help	predict	the	likelihood	of	election	violence.	
The	observable	implications	of	our	argument	are	tested	using	newly	available	
cross‐national	evidence	on	elections,	government	use	of	pre‐	and	post‐election	
violence,	and	post‐election	protests	from	1981	to	2004.	
	 	
	
	
2	
When	Do	Governments	Resort	to	Election	Violence?1	
On	paper,	Azerbaijan	is	a	multiparty	democracy,	and	has	held	periodic	
multi‐party	presidential	and	parliamentary	elections	since	the	country	regained	
independence	in	1991.	Despite	the	nominal	existence	of	democratic	institutions,	
tactics	of	electoral	manipulation	used	by	the	government	include	overt	election	
fraud,	violence,	and	intimidation.	Opposition	supporters,	opposition	candidates,	
and	journalists	risk	torture,	arbitrary	arrest,	and	political	imprisonment—all	
strategies	the	government	uses	to	“win”	elections.2	For	example,	in	the	run	up	to	
the	2005	parliamentary	elections	in	Azerbaijan,	facing	the	possibility	that	the	
“colour	revolutions”	of	Georgia	and	Ukraine	would	spread,	the	government	
arrested	journalists	and	attempted	to	prevent	the	opposition	from	campaigning.	
The	police	detained	over	a	thousand	activists	before	the	election,	and	jailed	
hundreds	without	cause.3	After	the	election,	amid	accusations	of	fraud,	the	
government	announced	that	the	ruling	party	won	an	overwhelming	majority,	
																																																								
1	Support	for	this	research	was	provided	by	the	Laboratory	on	International	Law	and	Regulation	
at	the	University	of	California,	San	Diego,	the	Woodrow	Wilson	School	of	Public	and	International	
Affairs	at	Princeton	University,	and	the	MacMillan	Center	for	International	and	Area	Studies	at	
Yale	University.	Replication	data	and	Online	Appendix	are	available	at	http://__________.	For	
helpful	comments,	we	would	like	to	thank	participants	at	workshops	at	UCSD,	George	
Washington	University,	Yale	University,	and	panel	participants	at	the	2010	ISA	annual	meeting,	
as	well	as	Jason	Brownlee,	Sarah	Bush,	Gary	Cox,	David	Cingranelli,	Daniela	Donno,	Christian	
Davenport,	Thad	Dunning,,	Christopher	Fariss,	Tom	Flores,	David	Lake,	Ellen	Lust,	Irfan	
Nooruddin,	Philip	Roeder,	Ken	Scheve,	and	Susan	Stokes.	We	also	thank	Sarah	Knoesen	and	
Michael	Plouffe	for	valuable	research	assistance.	Any	errors	or	omissions	are	our	own.		
2	U.S.	Department	of	State	2006a.	
3	Osborn	2005.	
	
	
3	
with	the	next	largest	opposition	coalition	winning	only	eight	parliamentary	
seats.	Reputable	international	observers,	who	documented	fraud	in	more	than	
43	per	cent	of	observed	precincts,	condemned	the	elections.4	Opposition	
supporters	began	to	protest	the	results,	assembling	more	than	7,000	people.	Riot	
police	and	military	forces	disbursed	the	protesters	using	clubs	and	water	
cannons,	and	several	opposition	politicians	were	beaten.5	In	the	end,	despite	
international	and	domestic	backlash,	the	incumbent	remained	in	power.6			
Government‐sponsored	election	violence—events	in	which	incumbent	
leaders	and	ruling	party	agents	employ	or	threaten	violence	against	the	political	
opposition	or	potential	voters	before,	during,	or	after	elections—is	common.	
Figure	1	depicts	the	yearly	number	of	elections	in	our	sample	characterized	by	
pre‐	or	post‐election	violence	from	1960	to	2010.	The	prevalence	of	election	
violence	raises	several	questions:	When	are	governments	likely	to	use	election	
violence?	And	perhaps	more	importantly,	what	can	mitigate	the	incentives	to	use	
violence?		
Although	political	violence	occurs	in	many	forms,	this	article	focuses	on	
the	use	of	election	violence	by	incumbent	governments.	Governments	are	the	
most	common—and	often	the	most	brutal—perpetrators	of	election	violence.7	
Using	cross‐national	data	on	elections	and	state‐sponsored	election	violence	
																																																								
4	OSCE/ODIHR	2006.	
5	U.S.	Department	of	State	2006a.	
6	Valiyev	2006.	
7	Although	there	are	other	perpetrators	of	election	violence,	they	are	not	the	focus	of	this	article.	
And,	at	least	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa,	the	vast	majority	of	election	violence	is	perpetrated	by	the	
incumbent	Straus	and	Taylor	2012.	
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(including	threats	of	violence	such	as	harassment),	we	present	and	test	a	theory	
of	when	an	incumbent	government	is	likely	to	use	election	violence	prior	to	or	
after	an	election.	Our	central	argument	is	that	an	incumbent’s	fear	of	losing	
power	as	the	result	of	an	election,	as	well	as	institutionalized	constraints	on	the	
incumbent’s	decision‐making	powers,	are	pivotal	in	her	decision	to	use	election	
violence.	While	it	may	seem	obvious	to	suggest	that	incumbents	use	election	
violence	in	an	effort	to	fend	off	threats	to	their	power,	it	is	not	obvious	how	to	
gauge	these	threats,	and	a	central	purpose	of	our	research	is	to	identify	sources	
of	information	about	the	incumbent’s	popularity	that	can	help	predict	the	
likelihood	of	election	violence.	Our	argument	applies	to	government‐sponsored	
violence	in	both	the	pre‐	and	post‐election	periods,	although	the	election‐related	
threats	to	an	incumbent’s	hold	on	power	are	different	before	and	after	the	
election.		
In	the	pre‐election	period	(leading	up	to	and	including	election	day),	
incumbent	governments	may	use	violence	in	an	effort	to	prevent	an	electoral	
outcome	that	is	unfavourable	to	the	ruling	political	party	or	incumbent	
candidate.	Pre‐election	violence	can	alter	the	election	results	in	the	incumbent’s	
favour	by	reducing	her	electoral	competition.	More	specifically,	violence	can	
provoke	the	political	opposition	to	boycott	the	election	and/or	influence	voter	
turnout	in	the	incumbent’s	favour,	both	of	which	increase	the	probability	that	the	
incumbent	stays	in	power.8	Thus,	a	government	has	the	incentive	to	use	pre‐
election	violence	when	the	incumbent	candidate	or	party	believes	the	election	
outcome	could	be	unfavourable.	However,	fear	of	losing	power	is	not	sufficient	to	
																																																								
8	These	results	have	been	demonstrated	in	Hafner‐Burton,	Hyde,	and	Jablonski	2011.	
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provoke	the	incumbent	to	use	violence.	Even	when	she	has	reason	to	believe	that	
an	election	threatens	her	survival	in	office,	institutionalized	constraints	on	the	
incumbent’s	decision‐making	powers	make	violent	election	strategies	hard	to	
implement	and	risky;	they	increase	the	odds	that	she	will	be	constrained	by	
accountability	groups	such	as	the	legislature,	ruling	party,	military	or	courts.	
Thus,	when	the	incumbent	is	uncertain	about	her	victory,	institutionalized	
constraints	on	her	decision	making	power	mitigate	her	incentives	and	
opportunities	to	use	pre‐election	violence.		
Figure	1:	Election	Violence	Over	Time	
		
Note:	Figure	is	based	upon	data	from	the	National	Elections	Across	Democracy	
and	Autocracy	dataset.9	Pre‐election	violence	is	a	count	of	all	elections	in	which	
the	government	harassed	the	opposition	or	used	violence	against	civilians.	Post‐
election	violence	is	a	count	of	all	elections	in	which	the	government	used	
violence	against	protestors	following	the	election.	
	
In	the	pre‐election	period	the	central	threat	to	the	incumbent	is	losing	the	
																																																								
9	Hyde	and	Marinov	2012.	
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election.10	In	the	post‐election	period,	however,	a	central	threat	to	the	
incumbent—who	has	survived	the	election	or	refuses	to	step	down—is	mass	
protest	against	the	election	process	or	results.11	Although	post‐election	protests	
are	relatively	rare,	the	incumbent’s	decision	to	use	pre‐election	violence	(and	
other	fraudulent	strategies)	to	stay	in	power	amplifies	the	risk	of	public	
demonstrations	against	the	handling	or	outcome	of	the	election	if	the	incumbent	
wins.	Protests	can	be	a	threat	to	the	incumbent	even	after	the	election	because	
they	indicate	that	citizens	have	solved	a	collective	action	problem	to	mobilize	
against	their	government.12	They	also	increase	the	probability	that	the	
incumbent	will	be	forced	to	hold	new	elections	or	step	down.13	Protests	thus	
provide	incentives	and	opportunities	for	incumbents	that	remain	in	power	after	
an	election	to	use	violence	against	protesters—in	other	words,	protests	can	
																																																								
10	In	addition	to	outright	losing	the	election	vote,	there	are	a	number	of	other	electoral	outcomes	
that	the	incumbent	may	view	as	a	threat	to	her	power.	For	example,	in	electoral	authoritarian	
regimes,	election	results	that	do	not	yield	a	sufficiently	large	margin	of	victory	can	be	a	
devastating	blow	to	the	incumbent’s	authority.		Additionally,	an	incumbent	president	can	be	
made	to	look	weak	and	thereby	threatened	by	the	results	of	a	legislative	election	that	does	not	
match	their	stated	expectations,	or	by	lower‐than‐expected	performance	in	a	subset	of	the	
country,	even	if	they	do	not	risk	losing	an	executive	election.	See,	for	example,	Magaloni	2006a;	
Simpser	2012.	
11	Other	threats	to	the	incumbent	include	coup	d’état	or	foreign	intervention.	We	focus	on	post‐
election	protests,	which	are	much	more	common	threats.	
12	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2006;	Tucker	2007.	
13	See	Figure	2	for	trends	in	post‐election	protests	and	how	often	they	lead	to	the	incumbent	
stepping	down	or	calling	for	new	elections.		For	examples,	see	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2006;	Bunce	
and	Wolchik	2010;	Tucker	2007.	
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create	a	link	between	the	incumbent’s	use	of	violence	in	the	pre‐election	period	
and	violence	in	the	post‐election	period.	However,	institutionalized	constraints	
on	the	incumbent’s	decision‐making	power	also	factor	into	her	decision	to	use	
violence	against	protestors.	Facing	post‐election	protests	that	could	force	her	out	
of	power	even	after	surviving	the	election,	an	incumbent	without	strong	
institutionalized	constraints	on	her	rule	is	more	likely	to	use	violence	against	
post‐election	protestors.		
In	the	remainder	of	the	article,	we	briefly	summarize	how	our	central	
argument	builds	on	existing	research	across	several	distinct	research	agendas,	
outline	our	theory	and	its	observable	implications	in	greater	detail,	provide	
examples,	introduce	our	statistical	strategy,	and	present	the	findings.				
DEMOCRACY,	ELECTIONS,	AND	REPRESSION	
Scholars	of	comparative	politics	generally	agree	that	holding	elections	
does	not	mean	that	a	country	is	democratic.14		In	fact,	less	than	half	of	the	
governments	that	now	hold	direct	elections	for	national	office	do	so	within	a	
context	of	consolidated	democratic	political	institutions	and	respect	for	human	
rights.15	Yet	there	is	little	debate	that	elections,	like	protections	for	human	rights,	
are	necessary	for	democratic	governance.16		
The	relationship	between	democracy	and	protection	for	human	rights	is	
enshrined	in	numerous	international	agreements,	including	the	Universal	
Declaration	of	Human	Rights.	Countries	including	the	United	States	and	most	
																																																								
14	Diamond	2002;	Levitsky	and	Way	2010;	Levitsky	and	Way	2002;	Mainwaring,	Brinks,	and	
Perez‐Linan	2001;	Schedler	2002a;	Zakaria	1997.	
15	Authors’	calculation.		
16	Dahl	1971;	Huntington	1991;	Riker	1965.	
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European	states	promote	democracy	globally	in	part	because	of	the	idea	that	full	
protections	for	human	rights	require	democratic	government:	democracy	
increases	liberty,	freedom	and	security	for	citizens.	Evidence	shows	that	stable	
liberal	democracies	are	much	more	likely	than	other	types	of	governments	to	
respect	human	rights,17	although	political	transitions	often	include	high	levels	of	
coercion	and	democratizing	governments	do	not	always	respect	human	rights.18		
Yet,	as	elections	have	spread	to	nearly	every	country	in	the	world,	so	have	
complaints	about	the	role	of	violence	in	democratization	and	the	use	of	violence	
as	an	electoral	tool.	Scholars	have	argued	that	elections	increase	political	
polarization	and	potentially	increase	human	rights	abuses	in	countries	without	
well‐developed	respect	for	the	rule	of	law,	and	that	even	politicians	in	
democracies	can	have	strong	incentives	to	use	violent	electoral	tactics.19	By	
contrast,	others	have	argued	that	elections	in	illiberal	states	eventually	bring	
about	broader	political	participation,	civic	engagement,	and	political	
accountability,	all	of	which	will	improve	respect	for	human	rights	over	time.20			
Cross‐national	statistical	studies	of	repression	and	elections	are	
abundant,	but	existing	data	has	hampered	efforts	to	distinguish	between	
																																																								
17	Henderson	1991;	Howard	and	Donnelly	1986;	Poe	and	Tate	1994;	Zanger	2000.	
18	Collier	2009;	Davenport	2007;	Snyder	2000.	
19	Zakaria	1997.;	Collier	2009;	Collier	and	Vicente	2012;	Robinson	and	Torvik	2009.	
20	Lewis‐Beck	1990;	Lindberg	2006a;	Lipset	1983;	Seligson	and	Booth	1995;	Sisk	1995.	A	related	
literature	explores	the	role	that	elections	play	in	bringing	about	political	liberalization:	Howard	
and	Roessler	2006;	Lindberg	2006a;	Lindberg	2009;	Roessler	and	Howard	2009.;	and	how	
parties	have	used	voter‐initiated	ethnic	riots	as	an	electoral	manipulation	tactic	(Wilkinson	
2006.)		
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elections	in	which	incumbents	use	violence	from	those	that	do	not—leading	to	
contradictory	findings.21	In	addition,	existing	work	has	largely	focused	on	
explaining	when	human	rights	abuses	increase	during	election	years,	rather	than	
explaining	variation	in	the	use	of	various	forms	of	election	violence	between	
elections	and	during	different	phases	of	the	election	process.		
For	example,	in	his	path	breaking	study	of	49	countries	from	1948	to	
1982,	Christian	Davenport	found	that	authoritarian	governments	were	
statistically	more	likely	to	reduce	censorship	and	political	restrictions	during	
national	election	years,	perhaps	in	an	effort	to	legitimize	the	regime	by	giving	
citizens	access	to	political	leaders.	He	found	no	relationship	between	elections	
and	political	repression	in	transitional	or	democratic	countries.22	In	a	follow	on	
study,	he	found	that	governments	also	tend	to	reduce	media	restrictions	during	
election	years,	perhaps	as	a	way	to	institutionalize	dissent.23	David	Richards,	
however,	in	a	study	of	elections	in	74	countries	(including	some	autocracies)	
from	1981	to	1987,	found	that	the	presence	of	national	elections	had	no	effect	on	
general	levels	of	government	respect	for	human	rights	in	an	election	year	one	
way	or	the	other.24	Focusing	on	democracies,	David	Cingranelli	and	Mikhail	
Filippov	argued	that	both	incumbents	and	opposition	leaders	strategically	
choose	to	engage	in	or	ignore	poor	human	rights	practices	in	the	absence	of	
proper	electoral	incentives,	and	that	among	democracies,	certain	electoral	rules	
																																																								
21	Contradictory	findings	in	this	literature	may	also	be	due	to	differences	in	case	selection.		
22	Davenport	1997.	
23	Davenport	1998.	
24	Richards	1999.	
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are	associated	with	better	protections	for	human	rights.25	
What	is	clear	from	the	research	agenda	on	elections	and	repression	is	that	
there	is	a	strong	connection	between	stable	liberal	democracy	and	government	
protection	for	certain	human	rights,	but	that	a	growing	number	of	elections	are	
taking	place	in	locations	where	democracy	has	yet	to	be	fully	consolidated.	To	
date	this	research	does	not	use	measures	of	election‐specific	violence	
perpetrated	by	incumbent	governments,	nor	does	it	separate	the	pre‐	and	post‐
election	periods.	Instead,	it	mostly	relies	on	aggregate	annual	measures	of	
human	rights	abuses,	which	may	or	may	not	be	related	to	election‐specific	
violence.	And	it	has	produced	conflicting	results	about	the	relationship	between	
repression	and	elections.	
PROTEST	AND	REPRESSION	
From	1960	to	2010	there	were	more	than	350	unique	cases	of	post‐
election	protest.26	Although	there	is	a	rich	literature	on	how	various	kinds	of	
protests	increase	the	use	of	repression	generally,	and	a	smaller	literature	on	the	
role	of	elections	in	sparking	protests,	few	previous	empirical	studies	have	
examined	both	election	protests	and	election‐specific	violence.		
Existing	research	on	(non‐electoral)	protest	has	found	evidence	that	
government	repression	provokes	various	forms	of	public	dissent,	including	
protests,	strikes,	demonstrations	and	rebellions.27	Studies	also	have	found	that	
the	use	of	repression	has	led	to	protests.	Davenport	documented	that	
																																																								
25	Cingranelli	and	Filippov	2010.	
26	Hyde	and	Marinov	2012.	
27	Carey	2006;	Davis	and	Ward	1990;	Gupta,	Singh,	and	Sprague	1993;	Machado,	Scartascini,	and	
Tommasi	2011;	Moore	1998;	Moore	2000.		
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governments	tend	to	respond	to	domestic	threats	such	as	protests	with	
repression	and	that	they	are	more	likely	to	apply	censorship	and	political	
restrictions	as	the	frequency	and	intensity	of	dissent	rises.28	Sabine	Carey,	
however,	found	that	only	guerrilla	warfare	increases	the	risk	of	political	
repression,	whereas	non‐violent	or	spontaneous	forms	of	dissent	do	not	create	
threats	substantial	enough	to	warrant	a	violent	government	response.29	Other	
studies	have	shown	that	the	relationship	between	repression	and	dissent	is	non‐
linear:	governments	overreact	to	small	demands	with	violence	but	as	demands	
increase	governments	often	exercise	more	restraint.30	In	some	cases,	
government	repression	and	accommodation	in	response	to	protests	have	been	
substitutes.31		
A	separate	research	agenda	focuses	on	elections	that	provoke	post‐
election	protest.	The	most	relevant	finding	for	this	article	is	that	manipulated	
elections	can	serve	as	a	focal	point	for	collective	action,	and	post‐election	protest	
(or	the	threat	of	protest)	can	be	an	important	part	of	self‐enforcing	democracy.32	
Election	fraud	and	violence	in	the	pre‐election	period	make	post‐election	protest	
more	likely.		
We	build	upon	these	different	bodies	of	research	to	investigate	the	role	
that	post‐election	protest	plays	in	a	government’s	decision	to	use	violence	
																																																								
28	Davenport	1995.	
29	Carey	2010.	
30	Gartner	and	Regan	1996.	
31	Moore	2000.	
32	Fearon	2011;	Przeworski	1991;	Przeworski	2006;	Schedler	2002a;	Tucker	2007;	Weingast	
1997.	
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following	an	election	where	the	incumbent	remains	in	power,	and	also	evaluate	
the	relationship	between	pre‐election	violence,	post‐election	protest,	and	the	use	
of	violence	against	protestors.		
ARGUMENT	AND	IMPLICATIONS	
Our	central	argument	is	that	information	about	the	incumbent’s	
popularity	in	different	phases	of	the	election	cycle	and	institutionalized	
constraints	on	her	decision‐making	powers	work	together	to	influence	her	
decision	to	use	election	violence	prior	to	and	after	an	election.	In	brief,	if	an	
incumbent	anticipates	an	unfavourable	electoral	outcome—such	as	an	outright	
win	for	the	opposition	or	a	result	that	makes	the	incumbent	look	weak—she	has	
incentives	to	use	violence	in	the	pre‐election	period	as	a	strategy	to	stay	in	
power.		Pre‐election	violence	can	help	the	incumbent	stay	in	power	by	reducing	
her	electoral	competition:	inducing	opposition	parties	to	boycott,	making	it	less	
likely	that	a	promising	opposition	candidate	will	run,	or	manipulating	voter	
turnout,	all	of	which	make	a	manufactured	“victory”	more	likely.	However,	not	all	
incumbents	act	on	these	incentives.	As	we	will	explain	below,	accountability	
groups	that	place	institutional	constraints	on	the	incumbent	can	mitigate	
incentives	for	violence.	One	implication	is	that	an	incumbent	that	is	uncertain	
about	electoral	victory	and	does	not	face	significant	institutional	constraints	is	
more	likely	to	use	election	violence.	
The	incumbent’s	decision	to	use	violence	(or	fraud)	in	an	effort	to	reduce	
her	electoral	competition	during	the	election	can	lead	to	an	unintended	
consequence:	public	demonstrations	against	the	handling	or	outcome	of	the	
election.	Although	it	is	relatively	well	documented	that	pre‐election	violence	and	
fraud	can	trigger	post‐election	protest,	this	relationship	has	not	yet	been	
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evaluated	within	the	broader	context	of	when	incumbents	choose	to	use	election	
violence.33	For	our	purposes	in	this	article,	protests	are	important	because	they	
can	topple	governments,	leading	to	resignation	of	the	incumbent	or	new	
elections.	Thus,	like	the	threat	of	an	unfavourable	electoral	outcome	in	the	pre‐
election	period,	post‐election	protests	are	a	threat	that	creates	incentives	for	
incumbents	facing	few	institutionalized	constraints	to	violently	suppress	
protesters	out	of	fear	of	losing	power	in	the	post‐election	period.		
Because	pre‐election	violence	is	one	factor	that	can	lead	to	post‐election	
protest,	and	because	post‐election	protest	can	provoke	post‐election	violence,	
another	observable	implication	of	our	argument	is	that	the	decision	to	use	
violence	in	the	pre‐election	period	can	create	incentives	to	use	violence	in	the	
post‐election	period.	Finally,	and	consistent	with	the	implications	of	our	
argument	in	the	pre‐election	period,	if	post‐election	protests	occur,	an	
incumbent	that	lacks	significant	institutional	constraints	is	more	likely	to	use	
violence	against	protestors.			
Fear	of	Losing	Power	
Elections	put	incumbents	in	a	bind:	they	can	bring	a	number	of	
advantages,	such	as	validating	a	leader’s	hold	on	power,	but	elections	also	
introduce	uncertainty	about	the	outcome.34	The	fear	of	losing	power	because	of	
																																																								
33	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2006;	Fearon	2011;	Hyde	and	Marinov	2008;	Magaloni	2006b;	Tucker	
2007.	
34	Brownlee	2009;	Cox	2008;	Levitsky	and	Way	2002;	Levitsky	and	Way	2010;	Magaloni	2006a;	
Simpser	2012.	Note	that	most	governments	in	the	world	now	hold	regular	elections,	although	
some	scholars	model	the	decision	to	hold	elections	as	an	endogenous	decision	made	by	leaders	
each	time	elections	are	held	(Cox	2008;	Gandhi	and	Przeworski	2009.)		
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an	election	(losing	the	vote,	facing	post‐election	protest,	or	other	unfavourable	
outcomes)	can	prompt	an	incumbent	to	respond	with	political	repression	of	
various	types,	including	violence.35	Threats	motivate	election	violence,	but	these	
threats	take	different	forms	in	the	pre‐	and	post‐election	periods,	which	we	
describe	in	the	next	section.		
Pre‐Election	Violence	
Prior	to	an	election,	the	incumbent	government	must	anticipate	whether	
the	outcome	of	the	election	is	likely	to	be	favourable	to	her	or	her	party.	If	she	
believes	that	she	is	popular	enough	to	win	the	election	outright	(or	to	win	by	a	
large	enough	margin),	election	violence—as	one	potential	tactic	in	the	“menu	of	
manipulation”—	is	unnecessary,	risky,	and	even	counterproductive.36	However,	
if	she	cannot	be	certain	of	a	decisive	victory,	or	if	she	believes	that	the	election	
outcome	is	likely	to	be	unfavourable,	she	may	resort	to	election	violence	in	an	
effort	to	reduce	her	political	competition.		
In	the	pre‐election	period	election	violence	is	a	strategy	to	reduce	the	
incumbent’s	political	competition	in	at	least	two	ways.	Harassment	of	the	
opposition—for	instance,	the	incarceration	and	torture	of	opposition	
candidates—increases	the	likelihood	that	the	opposition	boycotts	the	election	
and	the	incumbent	wins.	When	opposition	parties	withdraw	before	an	election	
takes	place,	the	incumbent	government’s	odds	of	winning	improve	
substantially.37	A	second	way	in	which	pre‐election	violence	makes	a	favourable	
																																																								
35	Davenport	1995;	Poe	et	al.	2000.	
36	Schedler	2002a.	Note	that	the	margin	of	victory	acceptable	to	many	electoral	authoritarian	
leaders	is	much	higher	than	the	majority	required	to	stay	in	power	(Simpser	2012.).	
37	Beaulieu	2006;	Lindberg	2006b.	
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electoral	outcome	more	likely	is	by	influencing	who	turns	out	to	vote.	The	
incumbent	government	may	use	violence	in	an	effort	to	persuade	voters	to	stay	
home	on	election	day,	coerce	would‐be	opposition	voters	into	voting	for	the	
incumbent,	or	threaten	voters	who	would	otherwise	prefer	to	abstain	into	
turning	out	to	vote	for	the	incumbent.38	Such	methods	of	intimidation	that	
increase	turnout	for	the	incumbent	and	decrease	turnout	for	the	opposition	are	
often	combined	with	other	methods	of	election	fraud.39		
In	the	UN‐administered	1993	elections	in	Cambodia—the	country’s	first	
potentially	democratic,	multi‐party	elections—the	incumbent	government’s	
Cambodian	People’s	Party	faced	strong	challenge	from	the	royalist	FUNCINPEC	
party,	and	sought	to	use	violence	in	an	effort	to	intimidate	their	candidates	and	
supporters	as	a	way	to	reduce	the	competition	and	win	the	vote.	According	to	
one	opposition	party	operative,	“the	State	of	Cambodia	is	creating	the	terror	
because	they	know	that	Funcinpec	will	win.”40		The	Cambodian	government	was	
responsible	for	over	70	documented	killings	–	and	more	than	100	injuries	–	of	
members	of	the	political	opposition	prior	to	the	election.41	The	perpetrators	
were	affiliated	with	the	government	and	the	political	parties	that	were	most	
threatened	by	elections:	the	Cambodia	People’s	Party	(CPP),	led	by	Prime	
Minister	Hun	Sen,	and	the	party	affiliated	with	the	“Khmer	Rouge”,	which	
																																																								
38	For	examples,	see	Blaydes	2010;	Human	Rights	Watch	2010.	
39	Lehoucq	2003;	Schedler	2002a.	
40	Philip	Shenon,	“Cambodia	Factions	use	Terror	Tactics	in	Crucial	Election.”	The	New	York	Times,	
May	9,	1993.		
41	U.S.	Department	of	State	1994.	
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boycotted	the	elections.42	Ultimately,	the	incumbent	party’s	fears	were	justified,	
as	they	fell	far	short	of	a	majority	and	only	managed	to	join	the	ruling	coalition	
when	CPP	leader	Hun	Sen	threatened	to	reignite	the	country’s	civil	war.		
Incumbents	are	most	threatened	by	elections	when	they	might	lose,	but	
judging	when	they	might	lose	is	difficult,	particularly	in	countries	in	which	the	
flow	of	information	is	restricted	and	expression	is	limited.	Some	incumbents	are	
able	to	gauge	their	popularity	prior	to	an	election	through	public	opinion	polls,	
and	the	most	straightforward	electoral	threat	to	the	incumbent	is	revealed	by	
reliable	public	opinion	polls	that	indicate	that	the	incumbent	is	unpopular.	If	
reliable	polls	indicate	that	the	incumbent	is	likely	to	lose	the	election,	she	will	be	
more	likely	to	use	election	violence	in	an	effort	to	reduce	her	political	
competition;	if	reliable	polls	indicate	that	she	is	popular,	violent	manipulation	
tactics	are	unnecessary.		
Yet	a	lack	of	information	about	the	incumbent’s	popularity	can	also	signal	
a	threat.	If	public	opinion	polls	are	not	available	or	polls	are	known	to	be	grossly	
inaccurate,	the	incumbent	may	have	difficulty	estimating	her	actual	popularity	
and	her	chances	of	a	favourable	election	outcome	will	be	uncertain.	We	argue	
that	if	reliable	polls	prior	to	the	election	are	not	available,	the	incumbent	will	
also	be	more	likely	to	resort	to	election	violence.	Put	another	way,	both	
uncertainty	about	her	popularity	and	reliable	proof	of	her	unpopularity	prior	to	
an	election	can	motivate	a	worried	incumbent	to	use	election	violence	as	a	
strategy	to	stay	in	power.	
Of	course,	polls	are	not	the	incumbent’s	only	source	of	information	about	
																																																								
42	Inter‐Parliamentary	Union	1993.	
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her	popularity,	and	public	statements	about	the	election	can	also	signal	the	
incumbent’s	confidence	of	victory.	The	incumbent’s	and	opposition	candidates’	
own	statements	about	their	probability	of	victory	provide	clues	about	whether	
the	incumbent	appears	to	be	concerned	about	an	unfavourable	election	outcome.	
In	general,	a	leader	who	is	confident	of	victory	has	little	reason	to	use	election	
violence—gauging	the	incumbent’s	level	of	confidence	is	thus	another	way	to	
gauge	threat	to	the	incumbent	and	predict	the	likelihood	that	she	will	use	
violence.		
Post‐Election	Violence	
Even	after	election	day	is	over,	incumbents	who	remain	in	power	may	still	
be	challenged	by	an	election‐induced	threat.	One	of	the	main	sources	of	threats	
comes	from	protests.	Post‐election	protests	indicate	that	citizens	have	solved	
their	collective	action	problem	and	are	willing	to	mobilize	against	the	regime.43	
Post‐election	protest	can	reduce	the	incumbent’s	credibility	and	build	
momentum	to	unseat	her	after	the	election.	
																																																								
43	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2010;	Tucker	2007.	
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Figure	2:	History	of	Post‐Election	Protests	and	Protest	"Success"	
	Note:	Successful	protests	include	any	case	in	which	election	protests	contributed	to	an	
election	being	cancelled	or	an	incumbent	being	deposed.	Repressed	protests	are	cases	in	
which	the	government	used	violence	against	demonstrators.44	
	
Figure	2	shows	the	history	of	post‐election	protests	and	their	“success”	in	
contributing	to	the	cancellation	of	an	election	or	the	resignation	of	the	
incumbent.	An	increasingly	large	share	of	protests	has	resulted	in	the	ouster	of	
the	incumbent	or	the	cancelling	of	an	election.	Like	polls	or	other	information	
about	the	incumbent’s	popularity	in	the	pre‐election	period,	protests	can	serve	as	
an	indicator	of	the	incumbent’s	popularity	in	the	post‐election	period.			
Existing	scholarship	demonstrates	that	post‐election	protests	are	
triggered	by	(among	other	things)	election	violence	and	fraud.45	Although	an	
incumbent	uses	pre‐election	violence	in	an	effort	to	reduce	her	electoral	
competition,	her	decision	to	use	violence	can	have	the	unintended	consequence	
																																																								
44As	coded	by	Hyde	and	Marinov	2012.	
45	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2010;	Magaloni	2006a;	Tucker	2007.	
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of	increasing	the	likelihood	of	post‐election	protest.	Because	post‐election	
protests	are	a	threat	to	the	incumbent	government’s	power,	they	can	provoke	the	
incumbent	to	respond	with	violence	in	an	effort	to	stay	in	power	in	the	post‐
election	period.46		
Institutionalized	Constraints	
We	have	thus	far	focused	on	how	the	fear	of	losing	power,	either	because	
of	the	election	or	because	of	post‐election	protest,	can	provide	incumbents	with	a	
motivation	to	use	election	violence.	Yet	a	number	of	incumbents	who	are	not	
confident	of	a	decisive	victory	prior	to	the	election	or	who	face	protests	after	the	
election	never	turn	to	violence	as	a	strategy	to	stay	in	power.	A	leader’s	choice	to	
act	on	motives	to	use	election	violence	is	constrained	by	her	ability	to	engage	in,	
and	the	anticipated	consequences	of	engaging	in,	violence	in	both	stages	of	the	
election	cycle.	Both	increase	with	“institutionalized	constraints”	on	the	authority	
of	the	incumbent	leader,	which	may	be	imposed	by	accountability	groups	
including	legislatures,	ruling	parties,	councils	of	nobles,	military,	and	courts.		
Given	that	the	incumbent	fears	losing	power,	one	way	that	
institutionalized	constraints	can	reduce	the	likelihood	that	she	will	resort	to	
election	violence	is	by	preventing	her	from	taking	actions	such	as	issuing	
directives,	mobilizing	the	police	for	partisan	harassment,	or	making	policy	
decisions	that	will	result	in	violence.	An	example	of	this	form	of	institutionalized	
constraint	is	a	legal	limitation	on	the	incumbent’s	ability	to	declare	a	state	of	
emergency.	A	government	that	declares	a	state	of	emergency,	for	instance,	can	
																																																								
46	Carey	2006;	Carey	2010.	Note	that	Carey’s	focus	is	not	on	post‐election	protest,	but	rather	on	
protest	more	generally.		
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legally	restrict	certain	human	rights,	often	leading	to	violence.47	However,	some	
executives	cannot	use	this	policy	without	oversight	from	national	accountability	
groups	such	as	legislatures.	In	Guinea‐Bissau	and	South	Africa	only	the	
legislature	has	the	power	to	declare	a	state	of	emergency,	while	in	Haiti	the	
legislature	must	approve	a	state	of	emergency	and	thus	acts	as	a	check	on	the	
executive’s	decision‐making	power.48			
Another	way	that	institutionalized	constraints	can	mitigate	violence	when	
the	incumbent	is	uncertain	of	victory	or	faces	post‐election	protests	is	by	
threatening	to	hold	her	accountable	for	the	decision	to	use	violence.	Violence	can	
lead	to	legal	or	political	prosecution.	Human	rights	abuses—such	as	torturing	the	
political	opposition	or	opening	fire	on	citizen	protestors—are	in	most	cases	
illegal	and	unpopular	among	citizens.	When	they	face	powerful	accountability	
groups,	perpetrators	of	these	crimes	risk	getting	caught	and	punished,	either	
while	they	are	in	office,	or	after	they	are	no	longer	in	power.	Legislatures	and	
courts	may	punish	leaders	for	perpetrating	violence.	For	example,	the	
Extraordinary	Chambers	in	the	Courts	of	Cambodia	(which	involves	both	
national	and	foreign	justices)	sentenced	former	Khmer	Rouge	leader,	Kaing	Gech	
Eav,	for	crimes	against	humanity	and	war	crimes,	including	his	role	in	overseeing	
the	torture	and	death	of	more	than	ten	thousand	people	in	the	1970s—a	time	in	
which	he	had	no	reason	to	believe	he	would	one	day	be	held	accountable.49	He	
was	sentenced	to	life	in	prison	and	required	to	testify	in	the	trials	of	three	other	
former	leaders	in	the	Khmer	Rouge.	Consistent	with	this	example,	we	argue	that	
																																																								
47	Hafner‐Burton,	Helfer,	and	Fariss	2011;	Neumayer	2011.	
48	Elkins,	Ginsburg,	and	Melton	2007.	
49	Human	Rights	Watch	2010.	
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election	violence	is	a	more	attractive	strategy	for	leaders	facing	an	uncertain	
election	only	when	serious	consequences	are	not	anticipated	because	constraints	
on	the	incumbent’s	decision	making	powers	are	not	deeply	institutionalized.		
Observable	Implications	
To	summarize,	our	argument	generates	three	observable	implications	
that	we	examine	in	the	remainder	of	this	article:	(1)	an	incumbent	that	is	
uncertain	about	electoral	victory	and	does	not	face	significant	institutional	
constraints	is	more	likely	to	use	election	violence;	(2)	an	incumbent	that	uses	
pre‐election	violence	or	fraud	increases	the	likelihood	of	post‐election	protest	
against	their	regime;	and	(3),	facing	protests,	an	incumbent	that	lacks	significant	
institutional	constraints	is	more	likely	to	use	violence	against	protestors	in	the	
post‐election	period.	In	the	next	section	we	provide	examples	of	these	
implications	in	elections	in	two	countries	with	prominent	histories	of	election	
violence.	
ILLUSTRATIVE	EXAMPLES	
We	have	chosen	five	elections	in	two	electoral	autocracies—Zimbabwe	
and	Iran—to	illustrate	the	observable	implications	of	our	argument	at	different	
stages	in	the	election	process.	In	both	countries	leaders	faced	the	threat	of	losing	
power	as	a	result	of	an	election	process	and	had	few	institutionalized	constraints	
preventing	or	discouraging	election	violence.	The	cases	vary,	however,	in	the	
factors	that	provoked—and	the	timing	of—election	violence.	For	each	election	
described,	we	present	detailed	monthly	data	on	instances	of	election	violence	
collected	from	an	analysis	of	all	reports	available	on	Lexis‐Nexis,	as	well	as	
supplemental	materials	by	NGOs	and	election	watchdogs	for	the	pre‐	and	post‐
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election	periods.50	
Election	Violence	in	Zimbabwe	
Robert	Mugabe	has	been	president	of	Zimbabwe—a	nominal	
parliamentary	democracy—since	the	country	gained	independence	in	1980.	
Since	2000,	Mugabe	and	his	political	party	associates	in	the	Zimbabwe	African	
National	Union‐Patriotic	Front	(ZANU‐PF)	have	faced	opposition	from	the	
Movement	for	Democratic	Change	(MDC)	and	their	leader,	Morgan	Tsvangirai.	
Presidential	and	legislative	elections	in	2000,	2002,	2005	and	2008	show	
variation	in	the	degree	to	which	the	MDC	threatened	ZANU‐PF’s	hold	on	power,	
culminating	in	the	very	close	2008	presidential	elections	that	nearly	resulted	in	
an	end	to	Mugabe’s	rule.	In	addition	to	using	direct	electoral	fraud,	ZANU‐PF	has	
regularly	rigged	elections	in	their	favour	by	terrorizing	political	opposition	
members	and	supporters	in	an	effort	to	reduce	the	competition.51		
Elections	in	Zimbabwe	show	how	even	an	autocratic	leader	like	Mugabe	
can	feel	threatened	by	the	electoral	process	and	therefore	become	motivated	to	
employ	tactics	of	election	violence.	Reliable	public	opinion	polls	were	virtually	
non‐existent	prior	to	elections	in	2000,	2002,	2005	and	2008.		Although	
autocratic	leaders	like	Mugabe	tend	to	project	confidence	before	elections,	a	
																																																								
50	We	searched	all	available	news	reports	and	human	rights	reports	for	cases	of	election‐related	
and	government	sponsored	human	rights	abuses	in	the	pre‐and	post‐election	periods	(one	year	
before	and	after	election	day).	These	data	include	the	date	of	the	incident,	the	alleged	
perpetrator,	the	reported	victim,	and	the	number	of	people	affected.		These	data	and	sources	will	
be	available	on	the	corresponding	author’s	website.	We	thank	Sarah	Knosen	for	invaluable	
research	assistance.	
51	Krieger	2000;	Kriger	2005.	
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suppressed	informational	environment	generates	uncertainty	about	their	true	
popularity	and	creates	incentives	to	use	tactics	of	manipulation	pre‐emptively	in	
order	to	avoid	any	unfavourable	electoral	outcomes.		
Uncertainty	about	Mugabe’s	true	popularity	created	incentives	for	the	
ZANU‐PF	to	violently	harass	MDC	candidates	and	target—even	kill—citizens	
prior	to	each	election.	The	violence	worked	to	reduce	electoral	competition,	
provoked	several	opposition	boycotts,	and	manipulated	voters	into	supporting	
ZANU‐PF.52	Mugabe’s	authority	was	virtually	unchecked	by	domestic	
accountability	groups:	there	were	very	few	regular	limitations	on	the	president’s	
actions,	constitutional	restrictions	on	his	actions	were	largely	ignored,	the	
legislative	assembly	had	limited	power	or	independence,	and	rule	by	decree	was	
used	often.53	These	conditions—uncertainty	about	the	regime’s	popularity,	a	
potential	threat	from	an	opposition	movement,	and	few	institutionalized	
constraints—explain	the	repeated	bouts	of	pre‐election	violence	in	Zimbabwe.		
To	illustrate	the	patterns	of	election	violence	in	detail,	Figure	3	maps	
monthly	data	on	state‐sponsored	violence	before	and	after	elections	in	
Zimbabwe.	The	figure	shows	the	increase	in	politically	motivated	violence,	both	
in	terms	of	the	number	of	events	and	number	of	people	affected,	across	four	
elections:	the	2000	parliamentary	elections,	the	2002	presidential	elections,	the	
2005	parliamentary	elections,	and	concurrent	presidential	and	parliamentary	
elections	in	2008,	including	a	runoff.			
																																																								
52	Timberg	and	Mugari	2008a;	Timberg	and	Mugari	2008b.	
53	U.S.	Department	of	State	2001;	U.S.	Department	of	State	2003;	U.S.	Department	of	State	2006b.	
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Figure	3:	Variation	in	Political	Violence	by	Election	in	Zimbabwe	
	Note:	The	count	of	events	and	deaths	are	based	upon	a	search	of	all	news	reports	and	
human	rights	reports,	including	those	available	on	Lexis‐Nexis,	for	cases	of	election‐
related	and	government	sponsored	human	rights	abuses	in	the	pre‐and	post‐election	
periods	(one	year	before	and	after	election	day).		
	
Mugabe	won	the	1996	presidential	elections	with	more	than	90	per	cent	
of	the	vote.	The	opposition	was	not	particularly	strong,	and	the	2000	elections	
were	the	first	in	which	any	opposition	party	posed	a	real	challenge	to	ZANU‐PF	
dominance.	As	the	Financial	Times	reported,	the	MDC	“managed	to	defy	a	state‐
sponsored	campaign	of	violence	and	intimidation	to	attract	voters	from	all	
regions	and	ethnic	groups…”54	Mugabe	stepped	up	his	efforts	to	use	election	
violence	prior	to	the	election	and	“showed	signs	of	nervousness	as	votes	were	
counted…positioning	armed	riot	police	in	Harare	and	the	nearby	suburb	of	
Budiriro,”	conceivably	in	an	effort	to	prevent	post‐election	protests.55		
Although	the	MDC	had	little	chance	of	winning	the	2000	legislative	
																																																								
54	Mallet	2000.	
55	Ibid.	
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elections	(in	part	because	Mugabe	could	appoint	30	of	the	120	legislative	seats),	
the	newly	formed	MDC	was	widely	viewed	as	a	serious	challenger	to	Mugabe’s	
authority.	As	a	result,	during	the	2000	election,	police,	intelligence	officials,	war	
veterans,	and	ZANU‐PF	supporters	murdered,	tortured	and	intimidated	MDC	
supporters:	the	government	reportedly	killed	more	than	30	people	for	political	
reasons.56		Violence	began	several	months	prior	to,	and	spiked	during,	the	
election	(Figure	3).			
Since	2000,	the	MDC’s	has	threatened	Mugabe’s	hold	on	power,	which	has	
been	particularly	acute	during	elections.	In	response,	his	government	has	
engaged	in	a	campaign	of	election‐related	violence	against	the	MDC,	especially	in	
presidential	elections	in	which	his	personal	hold	on	power	is	most	directly	
threatened.	In	2002,	prior	to	and	during	the	presidential	election,	ZANU‐PF	ran	
torture	camps	across	Zimbabwe	to	“re‐educate”	opposition	supporters.57		The	
Times	of	London	reported	that	the	violence	campaign	led	to	dozens	of	deaths	and	
disappearances	and	hundreds	of	abductions,	assaults	and	torture	victims.58	As	in	
2000,	violence	began	in	2002	several	months	prior	to	the	election,	and	hundreds	
of	people	were	victimized	in	the	months	immediately	following,	including	344	
members	of	the	Young	Women’s	Christian	Association	who	were	arrested	during	
a	peaceful	post‐election	protest	against	the	results	of	the	presidential	election.59	
Not	included	in	these	figures	are	MDC	supporters	who	fled	Zimbabwe	after	the	
election,	fearing	persecution.		
																																																								
56	Amnesty	International	2001;	U.S.	Department	of	State	2001.	
57	Schlink	2002.	
58	Raath	2002.	
59	U.S.	Department	of	State	2003.	
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The	US	State	Department	accused	ZANU‐PF	of	manipulating	the	electoral	
process	in	the	2005	elections	through	corruption	and	intimidation,	including	
unlawful	killings,	politically	motivated	kidnappings,	and	state	sanctioned	actions	
by	security	forces	to	torture	members	of	the	opposition,	union	leaders,	and	civil	
society	activists.60	Mugabe’s	use	of	violence	was	somewhat	lower	than	in	the	
other	elections	shown	in	Figure	3,	in	part	because	the	ZANU‐PF	also	relied	on	the	
politicization	of	food‐aid	during	a	period	of	severe	economic	crisis,	which	we	did	
not	code	as	a	form	of	election	violence.61	In	this	election,	the	party	also	employed	
the	support	of	traditional	leaders,	who	threatened	their	subjects	with	eviction	if	
they	failed	to	vote	correctly.62	
The	2008	elections	marked	the	first	concurrent	presidential	and	
parliamentary	elections	and	also	the	most	serious	threat	to	Mugabe.	Before	the	
2008	presidential	election	Mugabe	banned	all	political	rallies	and	arrested	
Tsvangirai—ostensibly	for	violating	the	ban	while	attending	a	prayer	meeting.	
Tsvangirai	was	severely	beaten,	sustained	a	massive	head	injury,	and	was	denied	
access	to	medical	treatment.63	Nevertheless,	the	challenge	posed	by	Tsvangirai	
and	the	MDC	was	greater	than	in	any	previous	election,	and	the	MDC	won	a	
parliamentary	majority	for	the	first	time,	clearly	indicating	that	Mugabe’s	regime,	
and	Mugabe	himself,	were	increasingly	threatened	by	the	electoral	process	and	
by	increasing	public	support	for	the	MDC.	The	government	delayed	the	release	of	
the	results	of	the	presidential	election	for	more	than	a	month,	a	move	perceived	
																																																								
60	U.S.	Department	of	State	2006b.	
61	Nolen	2005;	Thornycroft	2005.	
62	Thornycroft	2005.	
63	Hearld	Sun	2007.	
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to	be	an	effort	to	remedy	Mugabe’s	poor	performance.	When	official	election	
results	were	finally	announced,	ZANU‐PF	received	43	per	cent	of	the	vote	and	
MDC	received	47	per	cent,	just	shy	of	the	50	per	cent	majority	needed	to	win	the	
first	round	outright.	Before	the	runoff	Mugabe’s	agents	instigated	a	deadly	wave	
of	violence	against	MDC	supporters.	Due	to	the	degree	of	violence	directed	
toward	his	supporters,	with	more	than	85	confirmed	murdered	and	thousands	
injured,	Tsvangirai	chose	to	boycott	the	runoff	in	an	effort	to	avoid	risking	the	
lives	of	more	of	his	supporters	in	this	“violent,	illegitimate,	sham	of	an	election	
process.”64		
In	summary,	the	lack	of	institutionalized	constraints	in	Zimbabwe	
between	2000‐2008,	and	Mugabe’s	use	of	election	violence	in	response	to	his	
waning	popularity	illustrates	part	of	our	argument.	Election	violence	was	
triggered	by	the	rising	popularity	of	the	MDC	and	was	successful	at	generating	
short‐term	reductions	in	political	competition.		
Post‐election	Violence	in	Iran	
The	2009	election	in	Iran	illustrates	a	situation	in	which	the	highest	levels	
of	violence	occurred	in	the	month	after	the	election,	as	a	response	to	public	
protest	against	fraudulent	results.		Like	Zimbabwe,	the	chief	executives	in	the	
Iranian	government	experience	very	few	institutionalized	constraints	on	their	
decision‐making	powers.	This	combination	of	unpopularity	revealed	through	
mass	post‐election	protest	against	a	government	with	few	institutionalized	
constraints	helps	to	explain	why	the	government	resorted	to	significant	violence	
against	protestors.	
																																																								
64	Geoghegan	2008.	
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Typically,	the	Iranian	process	of	candidate	screening	by	the	Guardian	
Council	guarantees	that	the	majority	of	candidates	are	prohibited	from	running.	
In	2009,	the	incumbent	president	Ahmadinejad	was	apparently	caught	by	
surprise	when	popular	sentiment	turned	against	him	just	before	the	election,	and	
(albeit	unreliable)	polls	conducted	a	few	days	prior	to	the	election	suggested	that	
one	of	the	permitted	candidates,	Mir‐Hossein	Mousavi,	could	gain	enough	votes	
to	force	a	runoff	election.65			
Following	the	election,	both	candidates	declared	victory.	In	an	abnormally	
rapid	vote	“count,”	authorities	declared	the	incumbent	president	the	winner.	
Protests	erupted	and	millions	of	people	took	to	the	streets	to	dispute	the	
fraudulent	results.	The	protests	were	a	clear	indication	of	the	people’s	
dissatisfaction	with	the	incumbent	and	a	threat	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	regime,	
and	consistent	with	our	argument,	the	government	responded	with	violence.	On	
June	14th,	plainclothes	forces	attacked	a	Tehran	University	dormitory	and	
reportedly	killed	five	student	protesters.	On	June	16th,	the	government	banned	
foreign	journalists	from	the	streets;	and	arrested	almost	100	people,	including	
former	government	ministers	and	senior	political	figures.	Riot	police	dispersed	
protests	in	Tehran	and	were	videotaped	killing	Neda	Agha,	a	young	bystander	
who	became	an	icon	for	the	anti‐government	movement.	Protests	continued	and	
the	government	responded	with	more	violence.	Over	the	next	few	months	4,000	
protesters	would	be	arrested,	and	others	would	be	killed	as	a	direct	consequence	
of	election‐induced	violence.	Figure	4	maps	monthly	data	on	state‐sponsored	
violence	before	and	after	the	June	12,	2009	election,	illustrating	the	increase	in	
																																																								
65	The	Economist	2009;	Ron	Synovitz	2009.	
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election	violence	in	terms	of	the	number	of	events	and	number	of	people	
affected.	
As	President	Ahmadinejad	was	sworn	into	office,	government	controlled	
courts	began	show	trials,	with	many	detainees	allegedly	coerced	into	confessing	
that	they	participated	in	a	foreign‐backed	attempt	to	overthrow	the	government.	
Security	officials	shut	down	the	offices	of	a	committee	collecting	information	
about	torture	and	other	abuses	against	protestors	and	detainees.	Journalist	Ali	
Reza	Eshranghi	was	sent	to	prison,	followed	by	academic	Kian	Tajbakhsh	and	
other	prominent	intellectuals,	political	figures	and	journalists.	Many	were	
sentenced	to	death.66	Secrecy	surrounding	the	tallying	of	the	votes	means	that	
what	actually	unfolded	is	unknown,	but	observers	speculate	that	the	Iranian	
leadership,	having	already	screened	the	presidential	candidates,	was	
uncomfortable	with	any	results	that	would	have	suggested	a	close	election.	
Facing	a	worse‐than‐expected	performance	by	the	incumbent,	they	engaged	in	a	
hurried	falsification	of	the	results.		
In	short,	the	election	revealed	that	an	opposition	candidate	posed	a	
greater	threat	to	Ahmadinejad	than	anticipated,	and	perceived	election	fraud	
provoked	a	post‐election	protest	movement	that	further	threatened	the	regime’s	
grip	on	power.		In	response	to	this	threat,	the	government	diffused	protests	by	
committing	widespread	violence	against	protesters,	detaining	and	killing	leaders	
of	the	opposition	movement,	and	creating	a	climate	of	fear.	The	leaders	of	Iran	
responsible	for	the	political	violence,	like	the	leaders	of	Zimbabwe,	had	few	
institutionalized	constraints	on	their	decision‐making	powers	and	could	order	
																																																								
66	Amnesty	International,	“Iran:	Election	Contested,	Repression	Compounded.”	Available	at	
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE13/123/2009/en	(accessed	February	19,	2010).	
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and	carry	out	violence	with	little	reason	to	fear	accountability	for	their	policies.		
Figure	4:	Variation	in	Political	Violence	in	Iran,	2009	Presidential	Election	
	
The	count	of	events	and	deaths	are	based	upon	a	search	of	all	news	reports	and	human	
rights	reports,	including	those	available	on	Lexis‐Nexis,	for	cases	of	election‐related	and	
government	sponsored	human	rights	abuses	in	the	pre‐and	post‐election	periods	(one	
year	before	and	after	election	day).	
	
Elections	in	Iran	and	Zimbabwe	illustrate	how	unpopular	governments	
use	political	violence	as	a	tactic	to	manipulate	elections	in	the	pre‐election	
period—provoking	boycotts	and	manipulating	voters—and	suppress	dissent	in	
the	post‐election	period—harassing,	even	killing,	protestors.	In	the	next	section	
we	evaluate	our	broader	argument	using	new	cross‐national	data	on	the	use	of	
election‐related	violence.			
CROSS‐NATIONAL	ANALYSIS	
In	order	to	systematically	assess	the	observable	implications	of	our	
argument	we	employ	a	cross‐national	analysis	of	elections	data	from	1981‐
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2004.	Many	of	these	data	come	from	the	newly	available	National	Elections	
across	Democracy	and	Autocracy	(NELDA)	dataset.67	These	data	contain	
information	on	elections	for	national	office	for	all	sovereign	states	with	a	
population	greater	than	500,000,	including	detailed	information	on	the	
existence	of	several	types	of	election	violence,	as	well	as	on	post‐election	
protest.68	Sources	for	the	NELDA	data	are	diverse,	and	rely	primarily	on	news	
wire	reports,	newspaper	archives,	academic	research	including	the	data	
handbooks	on	elections	edited	by	Dieter	Nohlen,69	archives	for	specific	
countries	and	from	intergovernmental	organizations	such	as	the	Inter‐
Parliamentary	Union,	and	other	sources	which	are	listed	in	the	dataset’s	
codebook.70		
These	data	allow	us	to	conduct	more	fine‐grained	tests	of	the	correlates	
of	election	violence	than	existing	cross‐national	studies,	most	of	which	do	not	
measure	election	violence	directly	but	instead	rely	on	aggregate	annual	
indicators	of	various	forms	of	human	rights	abuses	on	entire	country	
populations71	or	aggregate	counts	of	demonstrations	or	protests	which	may	or	
																																																								
67	Hyde	and	Marinov	2012.	
68	A	complete	list	of	the	countries	in	our	sample	is	available	in	our	appendix,	which	we	will	make	
available	on	line	and	have	provided	to	the	editor	with	this	resubmission.	
69	Nohlen,	Krennerich,	and	Thibaut	1999;	Nohlen,	Grotz,	and	Hartmann	2001;	Nohlen	2005.	
70	Hyde	and	Marinov	2011.	
71	See	the	Political	Terror	Scale,	at:	http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/,	the	CIRI	Human	Rights	
Data	Project,	at:	http://ciri.binghamton.edu/;	and	Freedom	House,	at:	
http://www.freedomhouse.org/.	
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may	not	be	election	related.72	In	contrast	to	annual	indices	of	political	
repression,	which	measure	human	rights	abuses	during	a	given	calendar	year,	
our	data	focus	on	election‐specific	violence	perpetrated	by	the	incumbent	
government	and	distinguish	between	pre‐	and	post‐	election	violence	against	
civilians	and	opposition	parties.	These	data	also	measure	other	election	or	
regime‐specific	characteristics	central	to	our	argument,	such	as	whether	public	
opinion	polls	are	available	and	reliable	and	whether	the	incumbent	has	made	
public	statements	alluding	to	their	confidence	of	victory.	Table	1	provides	
summary	information	for	each	of	the	variables	used	in	the	subsequent	analysis.	
Table	1:	Summary	Information	
		 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	
Mean	
Violent	
Elec’s	
Mean	
Non‐
Violent	
Elec’s	
Pre‐Election	Violence	 0.30	 0.46	 0.00	 1.00	 n.a.	 n.a.	
Post‐Election	Protest	 0.14	 0.34	 0.00	 1.00	 0.36	 0.11	
Post‐Election	Violence	 0.06	 0.24	 0.00	 1.00	 n.a	 n.a	
Victory	Uncertain	 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.33	 0.52	
Polling	Unfavorable		 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.82	 0.74	
Executive	Constraints	 4.84 2.07 1.00 7.00 3.93	 5.17	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 3.19 2.31 0.00 8.00 4.64	 2.58	
Polity	(avg)		 2.35 6.87 ‐10.00 10.00 ‐0.67	 3.52	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)		 6.15 2.15 1 8 5.33	 6.21	
Political	Competition	(avg)	 6.36 3.37 1 10 4.86	 6.48	
GDP	(log)	 2.85 2.16 ‐1.77 9.33 2.30	 3.03	
Population	(log)	 16.16 1.50 12.47 20.80 16.26	 16.09	
Civil	War	 0.18 0.83 0.00 7.00 0.44	 0.07	
Electoral	Fraud	 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.68	 0.27	
Demonstrations	 1.33 3.22 0.00 43.00 2.09	 1.14	
Note:	(avg)	indicates	the	three	year	moving	average	lagged	by	one	year.	
	
Pre‐Election	Violence	
The	first	observable	implication	of	our	argument	is	that	an	incumbent	
																																																								
72	Banks	2005.	
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who	anticipates	an	unfavourable	election	outcome	and	lacks	significant	
institutional	constraints	on	her	decision	making	power	is	more	likely	to	use	
election	violence.	To	test	this	implication,	we	estimate	the	following	two	models	
for	each	election	i	in	country	j:	
Pr(Pre‐Election	Violenceij=1)=	f	(β1Polling	Unfavorableij*Executive	Constraintsij		+	
β2Polling	Unfavorableij	+	β3Executive	Constraintsij	+	φXij	+	γi	+	εij)	
(Equation	1)	
	
Pr(Pre‐Election	Violenceij=1)=	f	(Victory	Uncertainij*Executive	Constraintsij		+	
β2Victory	Uncertainij		+	β3Executive	Constraintsij	+	φXij	+	γi	+	εij)	
(Equation	2)	
	
where	 ௜ܺ௝	is	a	vector	of	control	variables	and	γi	are	country	random‐effects.	
These	random‐effects	account	for	the	likelihood	that	the	effect	of	electoral	
uncertainty	may	differ	systematically	for	each	country,	resulting	in	biased	
estimates.	Since	our	argument	is	about	the	threat	of	losing	power,	we	limit	our	
sample	in	these	estimates	to	any	national	election	in	which	the	office	of	the	
incumbent	is	at	stake	in	the	election.73	
We	code	our	dependent	variable,	Pre‐Election	Violence,	as	equal	to	1	if	
the	government	engaged	in	election‐specific	violence	against	civilians	(coded	
from	Nelda33)	or	harassment	of	political	opposition	members	(Nelda15)	and	0	
																																																								
73	To	ensure	that	we	focus	on	executive	elections	in	both	presidential	and	parliamentary	
systems,	we	rely	on	Nelda20,	which	measures	whether	the	office	of	the	de‐facto	leader	was	at	
stake	in	the	election	(usually	the	president	or	prime	minister).	
	
	
34	
otherwise.74	According	to	the	NELDA	codebook,	Nelda33	includes	“any	
significant	violence	relating	to	the	elections	that	resulted	in	civilian	deaths.”	
Nelda33	includes	no	specific	threshold	for	deaths,	but	violence	must	be	
“significant”	and	at	least	one	civilian	must	have	been	killed.	Violent	attacks	
against	civilians,	such	as	bombings,	do	not	count	unless	they	result	in	civilian	
casualties.	Harassment	of	political	opposition	members	(Nelda15)	may	include	
a	more	diverse	set	of	activities,	including	murder,	torture,	beatings,	violence	
against	participants	in	opposition	rallies,	indefinite	detention	of	candidates	or	
opposition	supporters,	forced	eviction,	harassment	of	media,	and	a	number	of	
other	methods.75	The	NELDA	data	do	not	define	any	specific	time	period	during	
which	election	violence	is	possible,	and	the	coding	is	specific	to	each	round	of	
an	election	rather	than	more	aggregated	units	like	country‐years.	Violence	is	
coded	as	election‐related	if	reports	connect	the	violence	or	harassment	to	the	
election	in	any	way.	Violence	unrelated	to	elections	is	not	coded	in	any	of	the	
NELDA	measures	of	election	violence.						
We	use	two	distinct	measures	of	whether	the	election	outcome	was	in	
doubt.	The	first	measure	uses	information	provided	by	public	opinion	polls	and	
the	second	relies	on	public	statements	alluding	to	the	incumbent’s	confidence	
of	victory.		Even	in	authoritarian	environments,	public	opinion	polls	can	
																																																								
74	While	almost	all	cases	of	harassment	involve	the	threat	of	violence,	not	all	cases	involve	
physical	injury.	We	show	later	in	the	paper	that	our	results	are	robust	to	only	including	elections	
with	civilian	casualties.		
75	Nelda15	excludes	cases	where	the	opposition	was	merely	banned,	or	where	the	opposition	
boycotted	(Hyde	and	Marinov	2011.)	In	addition	to	the	codebook,	the	notes	to	Nelda15	within	the	
dataset	were	also	used	to	determine	what	activities	were	included	as	opposition	harassment.		
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provide	reliable	information	about	whether	an	incumbent	is	certain	to	win	the	
election,	and	reliable	polls	are	available	in	over	63	per	cent	of	our	sample.	We	
draw	data	on	polling	from	two	NELDA	variables.	Nelda25	indicates	whether	
“reliable	polls	…	indicated	the	popularity	of	the	ruling	political	party	or	of	the	
candidates	for	office	before	elections.”	Nelda26	indicates	whether	those	polls	
were	“favourable	to	the	incumbent.”	76	(Incumbents	win	approximately	76	per	
cent	of	elections	in	which	polling	existed	and	was	in	their	favour.)	Using	these	
data	we	create	Polling	Unfavourable,	which	equals	1	under	two	conditions:	a)	if	
reliable	polls	existed	that	did	not	favour	the	incumbent	or	b)	if	reliable	polls	did	
not	exist.	Polling	Unfavourable	equals	0	if	polls	existed	and	favoured	the	
incumbent.		
This	variable	allows	us	to	test	the	argument	that	both	a	clear	signal	that	
the	incumbent	is	unpopular	and	a	noisy	signal	that	creates	uncertainty	about	the	
incumbent’s	popularity	create	incentives	for	Pre‐Election	Violence,	which	is	the	
measure	that	most	closely	tracks	our	theory.		However,	we	also	estimate	results	
excluding	cases	without	reliable	polls	(where	Nelda25	equals	“no”)	in	order	to	
evaluate	whether	the	same	logic	holds	when	we	examine	only	whether	reliable	
polls	existed	and	favoured	the	incumbent.		
Our	second	measure	is	based	on	Nelda12,	which	indicates	whether	the	
“incumbent	or	ruling	party	was	confident	of	victory	before	the	elections.”	
Nelda12	equals	“yes”	in	cases	in	which	the	incumbent	made	“public	statements	
expressing	confidence”	of	victory,	the	opposition	indicated	that	they	were	“not	
likely	to	win,”	or	there	were	cases	in	which	the	“incumbent	or	ruling	party	has	
																																																								
76	Ibid.	
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been	dominant	for	a	number	of	years	and	is	projected	to	win	in	a	landslide.”77	
We	create	Victory	Uncertain,	which	equals	1	if	Nelda12	equals	“no”	and	0	if	
Nelda12	equals	“yes.”78	As	face	validation	of	this	measure,	when	Victory	
Uncertain	is	1,	the	incumbent	wins	approximately	56	per	cent	of	the	time,	
compared	to	a	rate	of	92	per	cent	when	Victory	Uncertain	is	1.79	
An	important	part	of	our	argument	concerns	institutionalized	
constraints	on	the	incumbent.	To	measure	these	constraints	we	use	Executive	
Constraints	from	the	Polity	IV	dataset.	This	index	ranges	from	1	to	7	and	
measures	“the	extent	of	institutionalized	constraints	on	the	decision‐making	
power	of	chief	executives.”	80	At	the	highest	level	of	Executive	Constraints,	
accountability	groups	such	as	legislatures	and	courts	have	authority	equal	or	
greater	to	that	of	the	executive.	Examples	of	Executive	Constraints	include	the	
ability	of	a	legislature	or	ruling	party	to	initiate	much	or	most	important	
legislation.	Even	greater	Executive	Constraints	include	cases	in	which	an	
accountability	group,	such	as	a	legislature,	chooses	the	executive	and	the	
executive	is	dependent	on	its	continued	support	to	remain	in	office.	At	the	lowest	
level	of	Executive	Constraints	leaders	have	virtually	unlimited	authority	with	few,	
if	any,	constitutional	or	legislative	constraints.	Examples	include	the	frequent	
revision	or	suspension	of	the	constitution	by	the	executive,	cases	in	which	no	
legislative	assembly	exists,	and	the	existence	of	an	assembly	that	can	be	called	
																																																								
77	Ibid.	
78	Cases	of	“unclear”	and	“N/A”	are	treated	as	missing.		
79	Because	some	incumbents	will	have	the	incentive	to	misrepresent	their	own	popularity	and	
falsely	project	strength,	this	indicator	will	include	some	noise.		
80	Marshall	and	Jaggers	2002.	
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and	dismissed	at	the	executive’s	pleasure.	Low	Executive	Constraints	also	include	
cases	of	extensive	executive	control	over	accountability	groups—such	as	a	
legislature	or	courts.	
Since	election	violence	is	more	likely	in	repressive	regimes,	we	are	
mindful	that	we	run	the	risk	of	estimating	which	regimes	are	more	likely	to	be	
repressive	rather	than	which	regimes	are	more	likely	to	use	election‐specific	
violence.	Also,	since	democratic	states	are	more	likely	to	have	competitive	
elections	as	well	as	lower	levels	of	repression,	a	naıv̈e	model	would	likely	yield	
biased	estimates	of	the	relationships	most	relevant	to	our	theory.81	Therefore,	
we	control	for	the	pre‐existing	level	of	government	repression	(as	distinct	from	
pre‐election	violence)	by	including	a	measure	of	Physical	Integrity	from	the	CIRI	
dataset.82	This	variable	is	an	index	(0	to	8)	that	measures	the	annual	level	of	
government	sponsored	repressive	activity,	coded	mainly	from	Amnesty	
International	reports.	Since	this	variable	is	intended	to	control	for	overall	trends	
in	repression,	we	use	the	three‐year	moving	average	and	lag	it	by	one	year	to	
ensure	that	it	is	not	picking	up	election‐year	violence.		
We	also	want	to	ensure	that	our	results	are	not	an	artefact	of	the	level	of	
democracy	in	a	country.	We	thus	include	measures	of	political	competitiveness	
and	executive	recruitment	from	the	Polity	IV	project.83	Political	Competitiveness	
is	an	index	(1	to	10)	that	measures	both	the	level	of	regulation	of	political	
participation	and	the	competitiveness	of	participation.	Executive	Recruitment	is	
																																																								
81	Poe	and	Tate	1994.	show	that	democratic	states	are	less	likely	to	engage	in	physical	integrity	
violations.		
82	Cingranelli	and	Richards	2010.	
83	Marshall	and	Jaggers	2002.	
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an	index	(1	to	8)	that	measures	the	openness	and	competitiveness	of	executive	
selection,	as	well	as	the	institutionalization	of	executive	power	transitions.	To	
ensure	that	Political	Competitiveness	and	Executive	Recruitment	pick	up	overall	
trends	in	democracy,	and	not	election	specific	components,	we	use	the	three‐year	
moving	average	of	these	variables	lagged	by	one	year.	
We	also	include	several	additional	control	variables.	Because	wealth	and	
population	influence	the	use	of	violence,	we	include	GDP	(log)	and	Population	
(log),	from	the	World	Development	Indicators.84	Individual	leaders	may	be	more	
likely	to	use	election	violence	based	on	their	time	in	office	or	their	experience,	
and	all	models	therefore	include	Leader	Tenure	and	Leader	Age	from	the	
Archigos	dataset.85		Because	internal	conflict	is	correlated	with	human	rights	
violations,	we	include	a	binary	measure	of	Civil	War	from	the	Major	Episodes	of	
Political	Violence	dataset.86		
All	models	include	Electoral	Fraud	to	account	for	another	prominent	
tactic	of	electoral	manipulation.	Electoral	Fraud	(Nelda11)	is	a	binary	variable	
that	indicates	whether	there	was	“significant	concerns	that	the	elections	will	not	
be	free	and	fair”;	this	measure	relates	to	“domestic	or	international	concern”	
about	the	quality	of	the	election,	including	whether	“elections	were	widely	
perceived	to	lack	basic	criteria	for	competitive	elections,	such	as	more	than	one	
political	party.”87	We	also	include	Demonstrations	in	all	models	to	account	for	
other	types	of	civic	mobilization	distinct	from	post‐election	protest,	and	which	
																																																								
84	World	Bank	2006.	
85	Goemans,	Gleditsch,	and	Chiozza	2009.	
86	Marshall	2007.Dunning	2011;	Poe,	Tate,	and	Keith	1999.			
87	Hyde	and	Marinov	2011.	
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also	may	predict	pre‐election	violence.	Demonstrations	is	a	count	of	the	total	
number	of	anti‐government	demonstrations,	anti‐government	strikes	and	riots	
during	a	year	(based	on	Banks	CNTS	coding).88	
We	report	our	estimates	in	Tables	2	and	3,	in	which	the	core	models	use	
logit	and	include	country	random‐effects	to	account	for	country‐specific	
correlations	in	the	estimates.	Figure	5	presents	a	more	meaningful	picture	of	the	
estimated	effect	of	uncertainty	on	Pre‐Election	Violence:	it	plots	the	interactive	
estimates	from	Table	2,	column	1	and	Table	3,	column	1.	Each	point	estimate	is	
the	first	difference	based	on	when	either	measure	of	Uncertain	of	Election	Victory	
(Polling	Unfavourable	or	Victory	Uncertain)	changes	from	0	to	1,	estimated	at	
each	value	of	Executive	Constraints.		
	 	
																																																								
88	Banks	1975;	Banks	2005.	
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Table	2:	Logit	Estimates	of	the	Effect	of	Polling	Unfavorable	on	Pre‐Election	
Violence	
		
(1)
Core	
Model	
(2)
Only	
Reliable	
Polls	
(3)
Only	
Civilian	
Deaths	
(4)	
Fixed	
Effects	
		 		
Unfavorable	Polls	 2.37*	 4.97*	 2.40+	 2.63*	
		 1.07	 2.15	 1.43	 1.29	
Polling		*	Exec.	Const.	 ‐0.49*	 ‐0.87*	 ‐0.58*	 ‐0.62*	
		 0.20	 0.37	 0.27	 0.27	
Executive	Constraints	 0.24	 0.53+	 0.48+	 0.44+	
		 0.21	 0.31	 0.28	 0.26	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.44**	 ‐0.61**	 ‐0.40**	 ‐0.34*	
		 0.12	 0.20	 0.13	 0.17	
Political	Competitiveness	
(avg)	 ‐0.18+	 ‐0.38+	 ‐0.19	 ‐0.24+	
		 0.10	 0.21	 0.13	 0.14	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)	 0.31+	 0.73*	 0.34+	 0.13	
		 0.16	 0.34	 0.20	 0.25	
Population	(log)	 0.36	 0.87*	 0.81*	 1.25	
		 0.27	 0.44	 0.35	 2.03	
GDP	(log)	 ‐0.28	 ‐0.60*	 ‐0.68**	 1.03	
		 0.19	 0.30	 0.25	 1.03	
Leader	Tenure	 0.00	 0.01	 ‐0.02*	 ‐0.01	
		 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	
Leader	Age	 0.12	 0.02	 0.16	 0.28	
		 0.17	 0.27	 0.19	 0.23	
Civil	War	 0.54*	 0.53	 0.75*	 0.71	
		 0.28	 0.60	 0.32	 0.56	
Electoral	Fraud	 1.60**	 2.02**	 1.10*	 1.53**	
		 0.42	 0.76	 0.48	 0.50	
Demonstrations	 0.12*	 0.09	 0.12*	 0.08	
		 0.05	 0.08	 0.06	 0.06	
Observations	 599	 352	 597	 248	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐227.1	 ‐99.80	 ‐188.8	 ‐75.57	
Country	Random	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Country	Fixed	Effects	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	
Explicit	Civilian	Violence	Only	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
Reliable	Polls	Only	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	
+signiﬁcant	at	10%;	*signiﬁcant	at	5%;	**signiﬁcant	at	1%.	Standard	errors	are	
in	parentheses.	All	models	are	restricted	to	election	in	which	the	office	of	the	
incumbent	is	contested.	
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Table	3:	Logit	Estimates	of	the	Effect	of	Victory	Uncertain	on	Pre‐Election	
Violence	
		
(1)
Core	Model	
(2)
Only	Civilian	
Deaths	
(3)	
Fixed	Effects	
		 		
Victory	Uncertain	 3.17*	 1.46	 1.50	
		 1.32	 1.36	 1.56	
Uncertain		*	Exec.	Const.	 ‐0.52*	 ‐0.30	 ‐0.23	
		 0.23	 0.24	 0.27	
Executive	Constraints	 ‐0.11	 0.07	 ‐0.06	
		 0.15	 0.18	 0.18	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.38**	 ‐0.32*	 ‐0.33+	
		 0.11	 0.13	 0.19	
Political	Competitiveness	
(avg)	 ‐0.16	 ‐0.17	 ‐0.21	
		 0.11	 0.13	 0.17	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)	 0.27+	 0.32+	 0.12	
		 0.16	 0.19	 0.29	
Population	(log)	 0.30	 0.80*	 1.00	
		 0.26	 0.32	 2.06	
GDP	(log)	 ‐0.16	 ‐0.51*	 0.86	
		 0.18	 0.23	 1.05	
Leader	Tenure	 0.01	 ‐0.02	 ‐0.01	
		 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	
Leader	Age	 0.06	 0.02	 0.16	
		 0.17	 0.20	 0.24	
Civil	War	 0.46+	 0.72*	 0.73	
		 0.27	 0.31	 0.59	
Electoral	Fraud	 1.55**	 1.07*	 1.42**	
		 0.42	 0.47	 0.53	
Demonstrations	 0.11*	 0.11*	 0.08	
		 0.05	 0.06	 0.06	
Observations	 550	 548	 216	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐207.5	 ‐173.9	 ‐68.96	
Country	Random	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Country	Fixed	Effects	 No	 No	 Yes	
Explicit	Civilian	Violence	
Only	 No	 Yes	 No	
+signiﬁcant	at	10%;	*signiﬁcant	at	5%;	**signiﬁcant	at	1%.	Standard	errors	are	
in	parentheses.	All	models	are	restricted	to	cases	in	which	the	office	of	the	incumbent	is	
contested.	
	
Figure	5	provides	support	for	the	first	observable	implication	of	our	
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argument.	The	left	panel	illustrates	that	when	Executive	Constraints	are	at	their	
minimum,	a	change	in	Polling	Unfavourable	from	0	to	1	increases	the	probability	
of	Pre‐Election	Violence	by	nearly	0.25,	on	average.	The	right	panel	illustrates	
that	when	Executive	Constraints	are	at	their	minimum,	Victory	Uncertain	is	
associated	with	an	increase	in	the	probability	of	Pre‐Election	Violence	of	nearly	
0.50	on	average.	When	Executive	Constraints	are	at	their	maximum,	there	are	no	
significant	effects	of	either	Polling	Unfavourable	or	Victory	Uncertain.	Incumbents	
are	more	likely	to	resort	to	election	violence	when	they	cannot	be	certain	of	a	
decisive	victory,	however,	the	presence	of	institutionalized	constraints	mitigate	
these	incentives	to	use	violence.	
Figure	5:	Effect	of	Polling	Unfavorable	and	Victory	Uncertain	on	Pre‐
Election	Violence:	
	
Note:	Point	estimates	represent	simulated	effects	(first	differences,	0	to	1)	of	changing	
Polling	Unfavorable	and	Victory	Uncertain	on	the	probability	of	Pre‐Election	Violence	for	
each	value	of	Executive	Constraints.	Estimates	are	based	upon	Table	2	column	1.	Vertical	
lines	indicate	the	95%	confidence	interval.	
	
Tables	2	and	3	also	provide	several	alternative	specifications	of	the	core	
models.	The	figures	showing	the	predicted	probabilities	of	election	violence	for	
these	robustness	checks	are	provided	in	the	appendix.		
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Beginning	with	the	polling	estimates	shown	in	Table	2,	Model	2	drops	all	
cases	where	reliable	polls	are	not	available	or	it	is	unclear	whether	they	are	
available.	This	limited	sample	includes	only	cases	where	reliable	polls	existed	
and	provided	a	clear	signal	that	polls	were	not	favourable	to	the	incumbent.	The	
coefficients	remain	consistent	in	sign	and	significance	with	those	reported	in	
column	1.	When	Executive	Constraints	are	at	their	minimum	in	this	model,	a	
change	from	0	to	1	(favourable	to	unfavourable	polls)	is	associated	with	an	
increase	in	the	average	probability	of	Pre‐Election	Violence	of	0.25.	
In	Table	2,	Model	3,	we	recode	Pre‐Election	Violence	to	exclude	
harassment	of	political	opposition	members	(Nelda15).	This	focuses	the	
analysis	on	whether	the	government	engaged	in	election‐specific	violence	
against	civilians	(Nelda33),	which	is	a	much	narrower	conception	of	election	
violence	than	our	definition.	The	coefficients	are	consistent	in	sign	and	
significance	with	the	coefficients	in	Model	1,	although	the	estimated	
substantive	effect	is	smaller.		When	Executive	Constraints	are	at	their	minimum	
in	this	model,	a	change	from	0	to	1	in	Polling	Unfavourable	is	associated	with	an	
increase	of	0.04	in	the	average	probability	of	significant	violence	relating	to	the	
elections	that	resulted	in	civilian	deaths.					
Finally,	in	Table	2,	Model	4,	we	re‐estimate	the	model	using	country	fixed‐
effects.	This	specification	validates	that	our	results	are	not	just	driven	by	time‐
invariant	characteristics	of	countries,	such	as	unobserved	institutional	or	
geographical	characteristics.	Yet	because	many	countries	have	no	cases	of	Pre‐
Election	Violence,	country	fixed	effects	yield	results	that	must	be	interpreted	with	
care.	All	observations	from	countries	without	variation	in	election	violence	drop	
out	of	the	model.	The	coefficients	on	our	variables	of	interest	remain	very	similar	
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to	those	from	the	random‐effects	models.		We	do	not	provide	predicted	
probabilities	for	the	fixed‐effects	models	because	doing	so	in	a	country	fixed‐
effect	logit	model	is	problematic.89	
Next	we	turn	to	the	alternative	specifications	shown	for	Victory	Uncertain.	
In	Table	3,	model	2,	we	restrict	the	analysis	to	cases	of	election‐specific	violence	
involving	civilian	deaths.	Although	the	signs	on	the	coefficient	estimates	are	
consistent	with	the	estimates	reported	in	model	1,	the	estimated	effect	of	
Victory	Uncertain	on	Pre‐Election	Violence	is	insignificant	for	all	levels	of	
Executive	Constraints.	In	our	view,	including	harassment	and	violence	involving	
civilian	deaths	in	the	operationalization	of	pre‐election	violence	is	much	closer	
to	our	theoretical	conception	of	election	violence.	Limiting	the	measure	to	only	
those	cases	of	election	violence	involving	civilian	deaths	is	a	much	narrower,	
conception	of	election	violence	and	the	smaller	coefficient	is	thus	unsurprising.		
In	Table	3,	Model	3,	we	provide	estimates	of	our	core	model	using	
country‐fixed	effects,	although	like	in	Model	2,	the	coefficient	on	Victory	
Uncertain	is	smaller.	Given	that	the	fixed	effects	model	drops	more	than	half	of	
our	observations,	these	results	are	not	surprising.	As	above,	estimating	
accurate	predicted	probabilities	in	the	fixed‐effects	logit	context	is	
problematic.90		
Post‐Election	Protest	and	Violence	
We	analyse	post‐election	protests	in	this	article	because,	when	they	occur,	
																																																								
89	When	using	logistic	regression,	“first	differences,	and	indeed	every	quantity	of	interest	but	
one,	are	impossible	to	compute	correctly	from	estimates	of	the	fixed‐effects	model.”	King	2001,	
499.	
90	King	2001.	
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protests	are	a	central	source	of	threat	to	an	incumbent’s	hold	on	power	in	the	
immediate	post‐election	period.	We	continue	to	focus	on	violence	by	the	
incumbent	regime,	and	in	estimating	post‐election	protests,	the	relevant	
universe	of	elections	therefore	includes	those	in	which	the	incumbent	has	not	
lost	and	conceded	defeat	in	the	immediate	pre‐election	period.91	The	existing	
literature	suggesting	that	fraud	and	pre‐election	violence	increase	the	
probability	of	post‐election	protest	motivates	our	models	of	protest.92	Our	
estimation	approach	for	predicting	post‐election	protests	is	represented	below	
for	each	election	i	in	country	j:	
Pr(Post‐Election	Protestij=1)=	f	(	β1Pre‐Election	Violenceij		+	φXij	+	γi	+	εij,	)	
(Equation	3)	
Pr(Post‐Election	Protestij=1)=	f	(β1Electoral	Fraudij		+	φXij	+	γi	+	εij,)	
(Equation	4)	
where	 ௜ܺ௝	is	a	vector	of	control	variables	and	γi	are	country	random‐effects.	We	
measure	Post‐Election	Protest	using	Nelda29,	which	indicates	whether	there	were	
“riots	or	protests	after	the	election”	that	were	“at	least	somewhat	related	to	the	
outcome	or	handling	of	the	election.”	93	Electoral	Fraud	(Nelda11)	measures	
whether	there	were	concerns	before	the	election	that	it	would	not	be	free	and	
																																																								
91	This	sample	still	includes	cases,	such	as	Côte	d’Ivoire	2011,	in	which	the	incumbent	lost	the	
election	but	refused	to	exit	power.		
92	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2006;	Fearon	2011;	Hyde	and	Marinov	2008;	Schedler	2002b;	Tucker	
2007.	
93	Hyde	and	Marinov	2011.	
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fair.94	As	in	the	pre‐election	models,	we	control	for	the	three‐year	lagged	moving	
average	of	Physical	Integrity,	as	well	as	for	GDP	(log),	Population	(log),	Leader	
Tenure,	Leader	Age	and	Civil	War.	We	also	control	for	the	three‐year	moving	
average	of	Polity,	coded	from	the	Polity	IV	dataset.95		
Table	4:	Logit	Estimates	of	the	Effect	of	Fraud	and	Violence	on	Post‐Election	
Protests	
		
(1)	
Core	Model
(2)
Fixed	
Effects	
(3)	
Core	Model
(4)		
Fixed	
Effects	
		 		 		 		 		
Electoral	Fraud	 1.63**	 1.30**	
		 0.31	 0.34	
Pre‐Election	Violence	 2.46**	 2.21**	
		 0.30	 0.33	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.12	 ‐0.14	 ‐0.11	 ‐0.13	
		 0.08	 0.10	 0.09	 0.11	
Polity	(avg)	 0.00	 0.01	 ‐0.02	 ‐0.02	
		 0.03	 0.03	 0.03	 0.04	
Population	(log)	 0.26	 ‐1.51	 0.24	 ‐1.70	
		 0.20	 1.33	 0.22	 1.41	
GDP	(log)	 ‐0.26+	 1.01	 ‐0.24	 1.10	
		 0.15	 0.72	 0.15	 0.81	
Leader	Tenure	 ‐0.01*	 ‐0.01	 ‐0.02**	 ‐0.02*	
		 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	
Leader	Age	 ‐0.10	 ‐0.03	 ‐0.13	 ‐0.07	
		 0.13	 0.16	 0.14	 0.17	
Civil	War	 0.04	 0.04	 ‐0.11	 ‐0.12	
		 0.14	 0.19	 0.14	 0.21	
Observations	 966	 482	 932	 458	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐347.1	 ‐179.2	 ‐314.4	 ‐152.6	
Country	Random‐Effects	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	
Country	Fixed‐Effects	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
+signiﬁcant	at	10%;	*signiﬁcant	at	5%;	**signiﬁcant	at	1%.	Standard	errors	are	in	
parentheses.	All	models	are	restricted	to	elections	in	which	the	incumbent	did	not	lose	
the	election	and	leave	office.	
																																																								
94	As	discussed	above,	this	variable	indicates	whether	there	was	“domestic	or	international	
concern”	about	the	quality	of	the	election	or	if	“the	elections	were	widely	perceived	to	lack	basic	
criteria	for	competitive	elections,	such	as	more	than	one	political	party.”Ibid.	
95	Marshall	and	Jaggers	2002.	
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We	present	logit	estimates	of	these	equations	in	Table	4	and	illustrate	the	
results	of	our	core	models	in	Figure	6,	which	shows	the	simulated	effect	of	Pre‐
Election	Violence	and	Electoral	Fraud	on	the	predicted	probability	of	Post‐
Election	Violence	Protest	when	all	other	variables	are	held	at	mean	values.	Our	
core	models	(in	columns	1	and	3)	include	country	random‐effects	and	we	show	
the	same	models	(in	columns	2	and	4)	with	country	fixed‐effects.			
Figure	6:	Effect	of	Fraud	and	Election	Violence	on	Post‐Election	Protest	
	
Shows	the	simulated	effect	(predicted	probabilities)	of	Electoral	Fraud	and	Pre‐Election	
Violence	on	Post‐Election	Protest	from	the	estimates	in	Table	4	column	1	and	3.	All	other	
variables	are	set	at	the	mean.		Vertical	lines	indicate	the	95%	confidence	interval.	
	
Consistent	with	the	literature,	we	find	that	both	electoral	fraud	and	pre‐
election	violence	are	strong	predictors	of	post‐election	protest:	both	variables	
are	associated	with	sizable	increases	in	the	probability	of	protest	across	both	
specifications.96	As	shown	in	Figure	6,	Electoral	Fraud	increases	the	probability	
of	protests	by	nearly	0.13.	Pre‐Election	Violence	increases	the	probability	of	
																																																								
96	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2010;	Magaloni	2006a;	Tucker	2007.	
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protests	by	over	0.20.	The	fact	that	pre‐election	violence	increases	the	likelihood	
of	post‐election	protest	suggests	that	the	use	of	pre‐election	violence	can	also	
have	unintended	consequences	for	the	incumbent	after	the	election.	
The	existence	of	post‐election	protests	allows	us	to	evaluate	a	final	
implication	of	our	argument:	given	that	the	incumbent	faces	post‐election	
protests,	she	is	more	likely	to	use	violence	against	protestors	in	the	post‐election	
period	if	she	lacks	significant	institutional	constraints.	Our	approach	for	
estimating	post‐election	violence	against	protestors	is	represented	below	for	
each	election	i	in	country	j:	
Pr(Post‐Election	Violenceij=1)=	f	(β2Executive	Constraintsij		+	φXij	+	γi	+	εij,)	
(Equation	5)	
We	measure	Post‐Election	Violence	using	Nelda31,	which	indicates,	in	
cases	of	post‐election	protest,	whether	the	government	used	violence	against	
demonstrators.	This	variable	equals	1	if	the	incumbent	used	violence	against	
demonstrators	and	0	otherwise.	As	in	the	above	models,	control	variables	include	
the	three‐year	(lagged)	moving	average	of	Physical	Integrity,	Political	
Competitiveness,	and	Executive	Recruitment,	as	well	as	GDP	(log),	Population	(log),	
Leader	Tenure	and	Leader	Age	and	Civil	War.	We	also	include	Pre‐Election	
Violence	as	an	additional	control	to	ensure	that	we	are	not	picking	up	the	overall	
likelihood	of	incumbents	to	use	election	violence.97	Since	violence	against	
protesters	is	only	possible	when	protests	occur,	we	include	in	this	sample	only	
elections	in	which	post‐election	protests	occurred,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	
																																																								
97	Only	20	per	cent	of	elections	with	pre‐election	violence	also	involve	the	use	of	post‐election	
violence,	however	85	per	cent	of	the	elections	with	post‐election	violence	also	had	pre‐election	
violence.		
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the	incumbent	decided	to	exit	power	after	the	election.			
Table	5:	Logit	Estimates	of	the	Effect	of	Executive	Constraints	on	Post‐
Election	Violence	
		
(1)
Core	Model	
(2)
Fixed	Effects	
		 		 		
Executive	Constraints	 ‐0.45*	 ‐0.58+	
		 0.22	 0.34	
Pre‐Election	Violence	 1.44*	 ‐0.14	
		 0.60	 0.89	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.21	 0.19	
		 0.17	 0.42	
Political	Competitiveness	(avg)	 ‐0.19	 ‐0.95*	
		 0.15	 0.43	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)	 0.32	 0.77	
		 0.22	 0.47	
Population	(log)	 ‐0.52	 6.63	
		 0.36	 5.16	
GDP	(log)	 0.47	 1.41	
		 0.30	 2.31	
Leader	Tenure	 ‐0.01	 ‐0.03	
		 0.01	 0.03	
Leader	Age	 0.58*	 1.13+	
		 0.29	 0.64	
Civil	War	 ‐0.08	 0.22	
		 0.29	 0.44	
Observations	 160	 92	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐88.37	 ‐25.42	
Country	Random	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	
Country	Fixed	Effects	 No	 No	
+signiﬁcant	at	10%;	*signiﬁcant	at	5%;	**signiﬁcant	at	1%.	Standard	errors	are	in	
parentheses.	All	models	are	restricted	to	election	in	which	post‐election	protests	
occurred.	
	
We	report	logit	estimates	of	this	equation	in	Table	5.	Column	1	reports	
estimates	that	include	random	effects,	and	column	2	reports	estimates	including	
country	fixed‐effects.	Our	results	are	consistent	across	both	random‐effect	and	
fixed‐effect	specifications:	the	coefficients	on	Executive	Constraints	are	negative	
and	statistically	significant.	Figure	7	shows	the	predicted	effects	from	column	1	
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of	Table	5.	A	decrease	in	Executive	Constraints	from	7	to	1	increases	the	average	
probability	of	violence	from	0.22	to	0.73,	suggesting	again	that	the	incentives	to	
repress	protesters	are	mitigated	by	the	presence	of	institutionalized	constraints.			
Figure	7:	The	Effect	of	Executive	Constraints	on	Post‐Election	Violence	
	
Shows	the	simulated	effect	(predicted	probabilities)	of	Executive	Constraints	on	Post‐
Election	Violence	from	the	estimates	in	Table	5	column	1.	All	other	variables	are	set	at	
the	mean.		Vertical	lines	indicate	the	95%	confidence	interval.	
	
CONCLUSION	
Using	newly	available	data	for	all	elections	held	in	the	world,	1981‐2004,	
this	article	evaluated	the	conditions	under	which	governments	are	most	likely	to	
use	violence	as	an	election	strategy.	These	new	data	have	several	advantages.	
They	measure	specific	forms	of	electoral	violence	directly	rather	than	assuming	
election	violence	is	measured	by	annual	measures	of	political	repression.	They	
separate	pre‐	and	post‐election	violence.	And	they	measure	important	variation	
in	the	popularity	of	incumbents	and	the	information	available	to	them	about	the	
potential	threats	induced	by	the	election.	In	contrast	to	previous	research,	we	
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have	shown	that	incumbent	leaders	are	more	likely	to	resort	to	repression—
specifically	violence—against	political	opposition	candidates,	voters,	or	citizens	
when	they	fear	losing	power	but	have	few	institutionalized	constraints	on	their	
decision	making	power.	We	have	also	shown	that	pre‐election	violence	can	have	
the	unintended	consequence	of	increasing	the	probability	of	post‐election	
protest,	and	that	once	post‐election	protests	are	initiated	against	the	incumbent	
regime,	institutionalized	constraints	on	the	executive	can	reduce	incentives	for	
the	government	to	respond	with	violence.	Using	new	monthly	data	and	examples	
from	Zimbabwe	and	Iran,	we	provided	illustrations	for	our	core	argument	that	
incumbent	governments	are	likely	to	use	election	violence	when	they	fear	losing	
power—because	they	possess	some	information	that	they	are	unpopular—and	
face	few	institutionalized	constraints.		
It	is	clear	is	that	as	elections	have	spread	to	nearly	all	countries,	some	
incumbents—including	those	in	countries	like	Azerbaijan,	Cambodia,	Iran,	or	
Zimbabwe—have	used	a	strategy	of	violence	in	an	effort	to	stay	in	power.	In	
effect,	elections	exacerbate	human	rights	violations	in	these	places	in	the	short	
term;	without	elections,	the	violations	would	probably	be	fewer.	However,	our	
results	do	not	speak	to	whether	or	not	leaders	who	use	election	violence	actually	
succeed	in	staying	in	power,	or	whether	periods	of	electorally	induced	political	
violence	are	inevitable	parts	of	political	liberalization.98	Many	of	the	world’s	
longest‐standing	consolidated	democracies,	including	France,	the	United	
Kingdom,	and	the	United	States,	experienced	periods	of	election	violence.99	This	
																																																								
98	Analysis	of	this	question	is	presented	in	Hafner‐Burton,	Hyde,	and	Jablonski	2011.	
99	See,	for	example,	Hoppen	1984;	Keyssar	2009;	Zeldin	1958.		
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history	raises	fundamental	questions	about	the	long‐term	relationship	between	
political	violence,	elections,	and	democratization.	Some	scholars	and	pundits	may	
be	tempted	to	interpret	the	fact	that	leaders	sometimes	use	political	violence	to	
manipulate	elections	as	confirmation	that	elections	are	necessarily	“bad”	for	
countries	without	a	history	of	elections	and	democracy.	Yet	our	analysis	does	not	
support	this	conclusion.			
Rather,	several	important	implications	follow	from	the	evidence	we	
provide	in	this	article.	First,	the	countries	that	are	most	likely	to	experience	
election	violence	are	precisely	those	places	in	which	the	incumbent	government	
feels	threatened	by	an	organized	and	potentially	powerful	opposition.	Although	
all	repression	is	clearly	detrimental	to	democracy	in	the	short	term,	competition	
is	necessary	for	democracy	in	both	the	short	and	the	long	term.	If	our	analysis	is	
correct,	then	more	often	than	not,	election	violence	may	be	a	symptom	of	a	
threatened	and	potentially	weakening	incumbent	government	rather	than	a	sign	
that	democratization—and	future	protection	for	human	rights—is	doomed.		
Second,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	our	analysis	draws	attention	to	the	
fact	that	there	are	a	variety	of	sources	for	information	about	the	incumbent’s	
popularity	(that	to	our	knowledge	have	never	been	studied	systematically)	that	
can	help	predict	the	likelihood	of	election	violence.	Though	it	may	seem	self‐
evident	to	suggest	that	incumbents	turn	to	violence	when	they	feel	threatened,	it	
is	not	obvious	how	to	gauge	these	threats.	That	is	why	anticipating	actual	
election	violence	in	the	real	world	has	been	extremely	difficult	to	do;	even	the	
most	dedicated	organizations	that	support	democratic	elections	are	rarely	able	to	
predict	when	violence	will	break	out.	Predicting	violence	is	not	just	an	academic	
exercise;	understanding	the	conditions	under	which	election	violence	is	most	
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likely	to	occur	and	how	it	can	be	mitigated	is	important	because	such	information	
can	inform	the	strategies	of	NGOs,	international	organizations,	and	other	
interested	actors,	allowing	them	to	better	anticipate	where	measures	aimed	at	
preventing	election	violence	are	most	likely	to	be	useful.	
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